Financial crashes were followed by deep recessions in the Sudden
study the linkages between financial collapse and macroeconomic crisis. This paper proposes an equilibrium business cycle model with an endogenous collateral constraint, and shows that its quantitative predictions are in line with the stylized facts of Sudden Stops.
[ Figure 1 ] Three main empirical regularities define Sudden Stops: (1) reversals of international capital flows, reflected in sudden increases in net exports and the current account, (2) declines in production and absorption, and (3) corrections in asset prices. Figure 1 illustrates these facts using five-year event windows centered on Sudden Stop events at date t.
1 The charts show event dynamics for output (GDP), consumption (C), investment (I), the net exports-GDP ratio (NXY) and Tobin's Q. 2 Sudden Stops are preceded by expansions, with absorption and production above trend, the trade balance below trend, and high asset prices. The median Sudden Stop displays a reversal in the cyclical component of NXY of about 3 percentage points at date t. GDP
and C are about 4 percentage points below trend, and I collapses almost 20 percentage points below trend. A weak recovery follows, but GDP, C and I remain below trend two years later. 3 Q reaches a through at date t 13 percentage points below the pre-Sudden-Stop peak, and it recovers about 2/3rds of its value by t+2.
The sharp economic fluctuations experienced during Sudden Stops also display three key properties that models aiming to explain this phenomenon should explain: First, Sudden Stops are infrequent events nested within typical business cycles. They are rare events by definition, because a key criterion to identify them is that a country's international capital flows are significantly below their mean (see Calvo et al. (2006a) ). Second, they represent business cycle asymmetries (i.e., we do not observe symmetric episodes of sudden large drops in trade surpluses accompanied by surges in output and absorption). Third, a drop in the Solow residual, rather than declines in capital and labor, accounts for a large fraction of a Sudden Stops' initial output drop, and this is due in part to factors that bias Solow residuals as a measure of "true" total factor productivity (TFP), such as changes in imported inputs, capacity utilization, and labor hoarding (see Enrique G. Mendoza (2006) and Felipe Meza and Edward Quintin (2007) ). The model proposed here is consistent with these three features of actual Sudden Stops.
Explaining Sudden Stops is a challenge for a large class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, including frictionless real business cycle models and models with nominal rigidities. This is because these models typically assume credit markets that are an efficient vehicle for consumption smoothing and investment financing. For example, in response to a large output drop, households smooth the effect on consumption by borrowing from abroad, while in Sudden Stops we observe the opposite (the external accounts rise sharply precisely when consumption and output collapse). In contrast, the literature on Sudden Stops views credit frictions as the central feature of the transmission mechanism that drives Sudden Stops (e.g.
Leonardo Auenhaimer and Roberto Garcia-Saltos (2000) , Ricardo J. Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurty (2001) , Calvo (1998) The model introduces a Fisherian endogenous collateral constraint into a DSGE model driven by standard exogenous shocks to TFP, the foreign interest rate, and the price of imported intermediate goods. The collateral constraint limits total debt, including both intertemporal debt and atemporal working capital loans, not to exceed a fraction of the market value of the physical capital that serves as collateral. Thus, the constraint imposes a ceiling on the leverage ratio. The emphasis is on studying the quantitative significance of this credit friction, along the lines of the literature on the macroeconomic implications of credit constraints (as in Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (1997), Ben S. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) , S. Rao Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) , Narayana Kocherlakota (2000) , Thomas F. Cooley, Ramon Miramon, and Vincenzo Quadrini (2004) , and Urban Jermann and Quadrini (2005)).
The results of the quantitative analysis show that the model explains the key stylized facts of Sudden Stops. Comparing economies with and without the collateral constraint, both exhibit largely the same long-run business cycle moments, but the former displays significant amplification and asymmetry in the responses of macro-aggregates to one-standard-deviation shocks. Amplification is reflected in larger mean responses in states in which the constraint binds. Asymmetry is shown in that the responses to shocks of identical magnitudes are about the same in the two economies if the collateral constraint does not bind.
Sudden Stop events in the model are very similar to the actual events illustrated in Figure 1 .
In particular, the model matches well the behavior of GDP, C, I and NXY. Moreover, the Solow residual overestimates the true state of TFP by about 30 percent. The model also replicates the dynamics of Q qualitatively, but quantitatively it underestimates the collapse of asset prices.
The collateral constraint adds three important elements to the business cycle transmission mechanism that are crucial for the model's favorable quantitative results:
(1) The constraint is occasionally binding, because it only binds when the leverage ratio is sufficiently high. When this happens, typical realizations of the exogenous shocks produce Sudden Stops. If the constraint does not bind, the shocks yield similar macroeconomic responses as in a typical DSGE model with working capital. As a result, the economy displays "normal"
business cycle patterns when the collateral constraint does not bind.
(2) The loss of credit market access is endogenous. 4 In particular, the high leverage ratios at which the collateral constraint binds are reached after sequences of realizations of the exogenous shocks lead the endogenous business cycle dynamics to states with sufficiently high leverage.
Since net exports are countercyclical, these high-leverage states are preceded by economic expansions, as observed in emerging economies. However, Sudden Stops have a low long-run probability of occurring, because agents accumulate precautionary savings to reduce the likelihood of large consumption drops. Hence, Sudden Stops are rare events nested within typical business cycles.
(3) Sudden Stops are driven by two sets of "credit channel" effects. The first are endogenous financing premia that affect intertemporal debt, working capital loans, and equity, because the effective cost of borrowing rises when the collateral constraint binds. The second is the debt-deflation mechanism: When the constraint binds, agents are forced to liquidate capital. This firesale of assets reduces the price of capital and tightens further the constraint, setting off a spiraling collapse in the price and quantity of collateral assets. Consumption, investment and the trade deficit suffer contemporaneous reversals as a result, and future capital, output, and factor allocations fall in response to the initial investment decline. In addition, the reduced access to working capital induces contemporaneous drops in production and factor demands.
It is important to note that standard DSGE models cannot produce Sudden Stops even if working capital and/or imported inputs are added. Agents in these models still have access to a frictionless credit market, and hence negative shocks to TFP and/or imported input prices induce typical RBC-like responses. Large shocks could trigger large output collapses driven in part by cuts in imported inputs, but this would still fail to explain the current account reversal and the collapse in consumption (since households would borrow from abroad to smooth consumption).
Adding large shocks to the world interest rate or access to external financing can alter these results, but such a theory of Sudden Stops hinges on unexplained "large and unexpected" shocks.
Large because by definition they need to induce recessions larger than normal non-Sudden-Stop recessions, and unexpected because otherwise agents would self-insure against their real effects.
In contrast, this paper shows that the Fisherian collateral constraint provides an explanation for endogenous Sudden Stops that does not hinge on large, unexpected shocks.
The collateral constraint used in this paper is similar to the margin constraint used by Mendoza and Katherine A. Smith (2006) in their open economy extension of the AiyagariGertler (1999) setup. The model studied here differs in that it is a full-blown equilibrium business cycle model with endogenous capital accumulation and dividend payments that vary in response to the collateral constraint, and the constraint limits access to both intertemporal debt and working capital. In contrast, Mendoza and Smith study a setup in which production and dividends are unaffected by the credit constraint, abstract from modeling capital accumulation, and consider a credit constraint that limits only intertemporal debt.
This paper is also closely related to two strands of the literature that study the quantitative implications of financial constraints for emerging markets business cycles. One is the strand that studies the effects of working capital financing on long-run business cycle co-movements (see P.
Andres Neumeyer and Fabrizio Perri (2005) , Martin Uribe and Vivian Z. Yue (2006) and P.
Marcelo Oviedo (2004)). The model of this paper differs in one key respect: Working capital loans require collateral, so that when the collateral constraint binds, the cutoff in working capital loans contributes to the amplification and asymmetry observed in the Sudden Stop responses of output and factor demands. Moreover, the model is parameterized so that only a small fraction of factor costs is paid in advance. As a result, working capital without the collateral constraint makes little difference for business cycle dynamics (relative to a frictionless economy). Epstein showed that SCU requires weaker preference axioms than the standard utility function with exogenous discounting. He also proved that a preference order consistent with those axioms can be expressed as a time-recursive utility function if and only if it takes the form of the SCU. Hence, ad-hoc formulations of endogenous discounting in which the discount factor is independent of individual consumption deliver stationary net foreign assets, but they are inconsistent with the preference axioms. 8 Another model-based approach to obtain a stationary distribution of assets is to set a constant rate of time preference higher than the interest rate (see Aiyagari (1994) ). There are also three
The preference specification is:
(1) , ε t R and ε t P follow a first-order Markov process to be specified later.
The representative agent chooses sequences of consumption, labor, investment, and holdings of real, one-period international bonds, b t+1 , so as to maximize SCU subject to the following period budget constraint:
The agent also faces the following collateral constraint:
In the constraints (2) and (3) 
∂ , where variables with bars are "market averages" taken as given by the representative agent but equal to the representative agent's choices at equilibrium).
The left-hand-side of (2) (2), we obtain the accounting equality for the "real" and financial sides of the economy's balance of trade:
The collateral constraint (3) implies that total debt, including both debt in one-period bonds and working capital loans, cannot exceed a fraction κ of the "marked-to-market" value of capital (i.e. κ imposes a ceiling on the leverage ratio). Interest and principal on working capital loans enter in (3) because these are within-period loans, and thus lenders consider that collateral must cover both components.
The collateral constraint is not derived from an optimal credit contract, but imposed directly as in other macro models with endogenous credit constraints (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) , and Kocherlakota (2000)). A constraint like (3) could result, for example, from an environment in which limited enforcement prevents lenders to collect more than a fraction κ of the value of a defaulting debtor's assets. As we explain below, when (3) binds, the model produces endogenous premia over the world interest rate at which borrowers would agree to contracts which satisfy (3).
It is also important to note that a variety of actual contractual arrangements can produce debt-deflation dynamics. The collateral constraint (3) resembles most directly a contract with a margin clause. This clause requires borrowers to surrender the control of collateral assets when the contract is entered, and gives creditors the right to sell them when their market value falls below the contract value. Other widely used arrangements that can trigger debt-deflation dynamics include value-at-risk strategies of portfolio management used by investment banks, and mark-to-market capital requirements imposed by regulators. For example, if an aggregate shock hits capital markets, value-at-risk estimates increase and lead investment banks to reduce their exposure, but since the shock is aggregate, the resulting sale of assets increases price volatility and leads value-at-risk models to require further portfolio adjustments. Mechanisms like these played a central role in the Russian/LTCM crisis of 1998 and the U.S. credit crisis of
2007-2008.
The assumption that the collateral constraint (3) applies to a representative agent acting competitively is not innocuous. On one hand, the competitive equilibrium is inefficient because the representative agent (ignoring the implications of its actions on the prices that enter in (3)) maintains a suboptimally low level of precautionary savings, and hence is exposed to Sudden
Stops with higher probability than a social planner that internalizes the constraint. 10 On the other hand, in a model with heterogeneous agents facing (3) at the individual level, instead of a representative agent, the fraction of agents hitting the collateral constraint would move over the business cycle because the Fisherian deflation process would have a cross-sectional dimension.
B) Competitive Equilibrium & Credit Channels
A competitive equilibrium for this model is defined by stochastic sequences of allocations [ ]
Without the credit constraint, the competitive equilibrium is the same as in a standard DSGE-SOE model. The constraint introduces distortions via credit-channel effects that can be analyzed using the optimality conditions of the competitive equilibrium.
10 Note, however, that Javier Bianchi (2009) compared the two equilibria in a Sudden Stops model similar to Mendoza (2002) and found that debt levels differ by small margins, and the NBER working paper version of Mendoza and Smith (2006) showed that at low price elasticities of asset demand the externality is quantitatively small (see http://www.nber.org/papers/w10940).
The Euler equation for b t+1 can be expressed as:
where λ t is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the date-t budget constraint (2), which equals also the lifetime marginal utility of c t , and μ t is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint (3). 11 It follows from (4) that, when the collateral constraint binds, the economy faces an endogenous external financing premium on debt (EFPD) measured by the difference between the effective real interest rate ( 1 h t R + ) and R t+1 :
This is the premium at which the SOE would choose debt amounts that satisfy the collateral constraint with equality in a credit market in which the constraint is not imposed directly. In the canonical DSGE-SOE model, international bonds are a risk-free asset and μ t =0 for all t, so EFDP=0. In the model examined here, if (3) binds, there is a direct effect by which the multiplier μ t increases EFPD. In addition, there is an indirect effect that pushes in the same direction because a binding credit constraint makes it harder to smooth consumption, and hence the covariance between marginal utility and the world interest rate is likely to rise.
The effects of the collateral constraint on asset pricing can be derived from the Euler equation for capital. Solving forward this equation, taking into account that at equilibrium q t equals the marginal cost of investment, yields the following: 
Thus, q t equals the expected present discounted value of dividends (d), discounted at the rates 1 t i t i R + + + that capture the effect of the collateral constraint. We can also combine the Euler equations for bonds and capital to obtain the following expression for the equity premium (the expected excess return on capital,
[ ]
This expression collapses to the standard equity premium if the collateral constraint does not bind and the world interest rate is deterministic. As Mendoza and Smith (2006) explained, when the collateral constraint binds it induces direct and indirect effects that increase the equity premium and are similar to those affecting EFPD. However, in the case of the equity premium, the direct effect of the collateral constraint is the fraction (1-κ) of the direct effect on EFPD, because of the marginal benefit of being able to borrow more by holding an additional unit of capital. There is also a second element in the indirect effect that is absent from EFPD, which is implicit in the covariance between λ t+1 and 1 q t R + . This covariance is likely to become more negative when the constraint binds, again because a binding collateral constraint makes it harder for agents to smooth consumption and self-insure, thereby increasing the equity premium.
As in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) , we can use the fact that the expected equity return satisfies ( )
to rewrite the asset pricing condition (6) as:
where the sequence of expected returns in the denominator follows from (7). Conditions (7) and (8) imply then that higher expected returns when the collateral constraint binds at present, or is expected to bind in the future, increase the discount rate of dividends and lower asset prices at present. Hence, if (3) binds at least occasionally in the stochastic steady state, the entire equilibrium asset pricing function is distorted by the collateral constraint, whether the constraint is binding or not at a point in time.
There is also an external financing premium on working capital financing that is easy to identify in the optimality conditions for factor demands:
These are standard conditions equating marginal products with marginal costs. The terms with
reflect the higher effective marginal financing cost due to a binding collateral constraint.
This premium represents the excess over R t at which domestic agents would find it optimal to agree to contracts that satisfy constraint (3) voluntarily.
The second credit channel present in the model, in addition to the above financing premia, is the debt-deflation mechanism. This is harder to illustrate analytically because of the lack of closed-form solutions, but it can be described intuitively: When the collateral constraint binds, agents respond by fire-selling capital (i.e., by reducing their demand for equity). When they do this, however, they face an upward-sloping supply of equity because of Tobin's Q (i.e. because of adjustment costs). Thus, at equilibrium it is optimal to lower investment given the reduced demand for equity and higher discounting of future dividends, and hence equilibrium equity prices fall. If the credit constraint was set as an exogenous fixed amount, these would be the main adjustments. But with the endogenous collateral constraint, if the constraint was binding at the initial (notional) levels of the price of capital and investment, it must be more binding at lower prices and investment levels, so another round of margin calls takes place and Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism is set in motion. Moreover, because of (9) and (10), the Fisherian deflation causes a sudden increase in the financing cost of working capital, lowering factor allocations and output.
It is important to note that the effects of the debt-deflation mechanism are not monotonic.
They are weaker at the extremes in which all of the assets can be collateralized (κ=1) or no borrowing is possible (κ=0) than in the cases in between. When κ=0, there is no debt-deflation because the constraint is an exogenous credit limit independent of asset values. When κ=1, the direct effect of the collateral constraint on the equity premium vanishes (see eq. (7)), which leaves only the indirect effects. Without uncertainty, the indirect effects also vanish, and κ=1 removes all distortions from the collateral constraint on i t and q t , and hence there is no debtdeflation again (c t and b t+1 still adjust, but they do so as they would with an exogenous credit limit). Thus, for the debt-deflation mechanism to be relevant, borrowers must be able to leverage their assets but only to a limited degree.
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II. Functional Forms and Calibration
A) Functional Forms and Numerical Solution
The quantitative analysis uses a benchmark calibration based on Mexican data. The functional forms of preferences and technology are the following:
12 This result explains why Kocherlakota (2000) found small amplification effects on output and asset prices in deterministic experiments using the constraint 1
, where x can be a fixed factor or physical capital. Since these are perfect-foresight experiments with κ=1, the debtdeflation mechanism is neutralized. Mendoza (2006) examined comparable simulations using the collateral constraint (3) without working capital in a deterministic setup and found large amplification effects with κ<1.
The utility and time preference functions in (11) and (12) are standard from DSGE-SOE models.
The parameter σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ω determines the wage elasticity of labor supply, which is given by 1/(ω -1), and γ is the semi-elasticity of the rate of time preference with respect to composite good c-N(L). The restriction γ ≤ σ is a condition required to ensure that SCU supports a unique, invariant limiting distribution of bonds and capital (see Epstein (1983) ).
The Cobb-Douglas technology (13) is the production function for gross output. Equation (14) is the net investment adjustment cost function.
B) Calibration
The values assigned to the model's parameters are listed in Table 1 . This calibration is set so that the deterministic stationary equilibrium matches key averages from Mexican data. 13 We adopt three assumptions to make the calibration easier to compare with typical DSGE-SOE calibrations: (1) φ =0 in the deterministic steady state (otherwise working capital payments 13 Note, however, that under incomplete markets the averages of the limiting distribution differ from the deterministic steady state because certainty equivalence does not hold. The differences are minor except for the ratio b/gdp, which is -0.86 in the former v. -0.326 in the latter due to the strong incentive for precautionary savings. This increases c/gdp by 2.5 percentage points in the average of the stochastic model. The rest of the target ratios differ by less than half of a percentage point. distort factor shares), (2) the collateral constraint does not bind at the deterministic steady state, and (3) the CRRA coefficient is set to σ =2.
[ Combined with the 0.088 depreciation rate, this value of k/y yields an average investment-gross output ratio (i/y) of 15.5 percent.
The value of p in the deterministic stationary state is set equal to the ratio of the averages of the ratios of imported inputs to gross output at current and constant prices, which is 1.028. (2006)).
Since aggregate demand in the data includes government expenditures, the model needs an adjustment to consider these purchases in order for the deterministic steady state to match the actual average private consumption-GDP ratio of 0.65. This adjustment is done by setting the deterministic steady state to match the observed average ratio of government purchases to GDP (0.11), assuming that these government purchases are unproductive and paid out of a timeinvariant, ad-valorem consumption tax. The tax is equal to the ratio of the GDP shares of government and private consumption, 0.11/0.65=0.168, which is very close to the statutory value-added tax rate in Mexico. Since this tax is time invariant, it does not distort the intertemporal decision margins and any distortion on the consumption-leisure margin does not vary over the business cycle.
Given the preference and technology parameters set in the previous paragraphs, the This implies a ratio of net foreign assets to GDP of about -0.86.
Next we calibrate the stochastic process of the exogenous shocks and compute Mexico's business cycle moments using the Hodrick-Prescott filter to detrend the data. Table 2 In addition, the Table shows that both imported inputs and equity prices are significantly more variable than GDP and procyclical.
[ Table 2 ] (2004) showed, with low working capital coefficients, the working capital channel has very weak effects on business cycle moments. Hence, the role of working capital in this model is limited to the amplification and asymmetry that it contributes to when the collateral constraint binds. Its effect on regular business cycle volatility is negligible.
III. Results of the Quantitative Analysis
The model is solved by representing the equilibrium in recursive form and using a non- further details on algorithms for solving models with collateral constraints linked to asset prices (see http://www.nber.org/papers/w10940). Given their finding that the externality resulting from the representative agent ignoring the implications of its actions for asset prices in the collateral constraint is small, the model is solving using their "quasi social planner" algorithm.
A) Long Run Business Cycle Moments
The first important result is that long-run business cycle moments are largely unaffected by the collateral constraint. Looking at Table 3, Panels 2 and 3 show that the only marked differences in long-run business cycles in economies with and without collateral constraints are on the moments directly influenced by it (the leverage ratio and the ratios of foreign assets and net exports to GDP). The means of the leverage and foreign assets ratios rise, and the mean of the net exports-GDP ratio falls, the variability of the three declines, and all three become more countercyclical.
The key feature of the model behind the result that long-run business cycle moments are unaffected by the collateral constraint is the precautionary savings motive. The high-leverage states at which the credit constraint binds are reached after cyclical dynamics in response to histories of shocks lead the leverage ratio to hit its ceiling. Because of the curvature of the utility function (11), agents accumulate precautionary savings to self insure against the risk of large consumption collapses in these scenarios. Note that precautionary savings are present even without the collateral constraint, because the standard DSGE-SOE model has incomplete markets. The average b/gdp without the collateral constraint at -33 percent is almost 53
percentage points higher than -86 percent in the deterministic steady state. With the collateral constraint at κ=0.2, the average b/gdp ratio climbs further to -10 percent.
B) Amplification & Asymmetry with the Collateral Constraint
The second key result is that the collateral constraint produces significant amplification and asymmetry in the responses of macro-aggregates to shocks. Table 4 reports amplification coefficients measured as averages of differences in the value of each variable in economies with the collateral constraint relative to the economy without credit frictions, in percent of the latter.
The higher the absolute value of these coefficients, the larger the amplification, with zero indicating identical responses with or without the credit friction. To calculate these coefficients, we first compute the amplification coefficient at each state (k,b,e), and then compute averages using the ergodic distribution of the simulations with the collateral constraint. In the SS (non SS) columns, the averages are conditional on the economy being (not being) in a Sudden Stop state.
16
Sudden Stops are defined in a similar manner as in the empirical literature (e.g. Calvo et al. (2006a) ): SS states are those in which the collateral constraint binds and the net exports-GDP ratio is at least two percentage points above the mean. The probability of hitting SS states in the stochastic steady state and the average b/gdp ratio at which this happens are shown in the last two rows of the Table. [ Table 4 ]
Panel (1) 
∑∑∑
. shown in Table 3 reflect mainly these non-SS states where there is almost no amplification due to the credit constraint, which explains the previous finding showing that business cycle moments with or without the collateral constraint are very similar. An important implication of this result is that relatively rare Sudden Stops coexist with the more frequent, normal business cycles summarized in the moments of Table 3 .
It is also worth noting that the responses in the SS and non-SS columns are produced by shocks that are at most one-standard-deviation in size, and that the shocks hitting the economies with and without the collateral constraint in each of the two columns of the Table are identical.
Thus, the model displays significant amplification and asymmetry in response to shocks that are relatively small, and it has the feature that symmetric shocks produce asymmetric responses.
Panels (2) to (5) of Table 4 show that the result indicating that the collateral constraint induces significant amplification and asymmetry is robust to several parameter changes. Panels Increasing (reducing) κ has small effects on most amplification coefficients, but it reduces (increases) the amplification effect on the leverage ratio and the probability of Sudden Stops.
Lowering the net exports-GDP threshold to zero weakens the amplification coefficients somewhat, but again the largest effect is on the probability of Sudden Stops, which rises sharply when the threshold used to define them is lowered significantly. Still, in all these scenarios there is significant amplification and asymmetry.
Removing working capital does change the results significantly. In particular, the model cannot generate any amplification in GDP and factor allocations, and the probability of Sudden Stops (keeping κ=0.2) is much lower than in the baseline. These results are due to the fact that, without working capital, factor allocations and output cannot be affected contemporaneously by the collateral constraint. In conditions (9) and (10), capital is predetermined and the external financing premium due to the binding collateral constraint is no longer present, and as a result (9) and (10) (k,b,e) . The rest of the macroaggregates continue to display significant amplification and asymmetry, although the amplification coefficients are smaller than in the scenarios shown in the other panels.
C) Can the Model Explain Observed Sudden Stop Events?
The simulations can also be used to evaluate the model's ability to account for the actual dynamics of Sudden Stop events in Figure 1 . To this end, we conduct a 10,000-period stochastic time-series simulation, and use the simulated data to construct five-year event windows centered on SS events. 18 Figure 2 shows the windows for GDP, C, I, Tobin's Q, and NXY, as well as for the shocks on TFP, imported input prices and the interest rate. To match the methodology used in Figure 1 , each window includes the median across SS events identified in the 10,000 period simulation. We also include for comparison one-standard-deviation bands, the actual event window observations from Figure 1 , and the observations from Mexico's 1995 Sudden Stop. To 17 This result hinges on the assumption that there is no wealth effect on labor supply. Without it, the tilting of consumption imposed by the borrowing constraint would distort labor supply. 18 These event windows capture dynamic effects beyond the initial impact effects captured in amplification coefficients. For example, the drop in I t when a Sudden Stop hits has a negative effect on GDP t+1 that is captured in the event window but not in the amplification coefficient. Alternatively, the dynamic effects can be illustrated using conditional impulse responses or cumulative amplification effects starting from an initial Sudden Stop as in Mendoza (2006) . 
In the baseline scenario with κ=0.2, the two are very similar except on the date of SS events, when the Solow residual falls more than true TFP. Thus, the model is also consistent with the data in predicting that part of the decline in GDP observed during SS events cannot be accounted for by changes in measured capital and labor, and that this decline in the Solow residual overestimates actual TFP (albeit the difference is not large).
However, it is also important to acknowledge that a 1.5 percent negative TFP shock is still needed for the output decline to be realistic, and the reason for this decline remains an open question beyond the scope of this paper.
[ Figure 3 compares the event windows of Solow residuals v. true TFP in the same three scenarios and the baseline. Note that we consider relatively small changes in parameters because otherwise the economies differ sharply in debt and leverage dynamics, and this requires recalibrating κ in order to study the effects of the occasionally binding collateral constraint. With the parameter changes we study here, the value of κ can remain at 20 percent in all scenarios.
[ Figure 4 ]
The model without working capital performs much worse than all of the alternatives in terms of its ability to account for Sudden Stop dynamics, reaffirming the previous finding indicating that the cutoff in access to working capital when the collateral constraint binds is important for the model's performance. The amplitude of the fluctuations observed in SS events is significantly smaller and the model cannot produce periods of expansion preceding Sudden Stops (GDP, C and I are already below trend, and NXY is above trend, before date t). This occurs because SS events without working capital are preceded by low and declining TFP (see Figure   3 ), instead of high and increasing TFP as in the baseline. The expectation of declining TFP leads to the declines in I, C and GDP before date t, and these cause the sharp increase in the trade balance. For the same reason, labor and imported inputs fall sharply (instead of rising) before the Sudden Stop hits, although again because the amplitude of SS fluctuations without working capital is smaller, the declines in labor and imported inputs at date t are much smaller than in the baseline. The output decline is not smaller at date t because the large decline in I t-1 reduces the capital stock at t, and this enlarges the size of the drop in GDP t , which otherwise would be much smaller than in the baseline (in the baseline, I t-1 rises so the higher capital stock at t contributes to offset the adverse effect of the declines in labor and imported inputs).
The scenarios with higher imported inputs share and lower labor supply elasticity show that these parameters also play important roles. The shape of the SS dynamics is roughly the same as in the baseline, so the model's overall performance does not worsen as much as in the scenario without working capital, but the amplitude of the fluctuations changes. A higher share of imported inputs strengthens the production effects of the three shocks present in the model. As a result the declines in GDP, C, working capital, labor, and imported inputs are larger with the higher share of imported inputs, while the dynamics of I and Q are about the same as in the baseline. The fit with the data actually improves, because the drops in GDP t and C t are nearly a perfect match to actual SS events. In addition, the higher imported inputs share creates a larger wedge between the Solow residual and true TFP (see Figure 3) . A mean decline of about 1.2 percent in true TFP when Sudden Stops hit translates into a mean decline in the Solow residual that is almost twice as large. that domestically produced inputs are substitutes for imported inputs, and purchases of domestic inputs require working capital financing, the scenario with the higher η is likely to be closer to the one that is empirically relevant, because domestic inputs would respond to a similar amplification mechanism as the one affecting imported inputs.
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The simulation with lower labor supply elasticity retains the same overall qualitative features of the baseline simulation: SS events are preceded by periods of expansion and followed by weak recoveries. With the weakened response of labor supply, however, the amplitude of the fluctuations is smaller, and the gap between true TFP and the Solow residual when the Sudden Stop hits is narrower, so the model does not do as well at matching the dynamics observed in the data. In contrast with the scenario that changed the share of imported inputs, lowering the labor supply elasticity does affect the behavior of investment and asset prices, both of which exhibit smaller declines than in the baseline scenario. Thus, these results show that labor supply elasticity of about 1.2, as in the baseline, or higher, is important for the model's ability to explain observed SS dynamics.
Mendoza (2006) conducted two additional sensitivity experiments that are worth noting.
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The first experiment demonstrates the importance of the debt-deflation channel by comparing amplification effects between a model with the Fisherian collateral constraint and an economy with a constant borrowing limit, set equal to the largest total debt (in bonds and working capital) attained with the Fisherian constraint. This change weakens the amplification effect on Q by a factor of 5.75 (from -6.9 percent with the Fisherian constraint to -1.2 with the constant debt limit), and that for I by a factor of 7.2 (-33 percent v. -4.6 percent). The second experiment studies amplification effects for each of the three shocks individually. In line with the results of the event analysis, interest rate shocks produce generally larger amplification effects, but all three shocks can produce Sudden Stops and generate amplification in macroeconomic responses.
IV. Conclusions
This paper shows that an equilibrium business cycle model with a Fisherian collateral constraint affecting intertemporal debt and working capital financing accounts for several key features of Sudden Stops. This constraint only binds in states of nature in which the leverage ratio is sufficiently high, and the economy arrives endogenously at these states as the result of business cycle dynamics.
The collateral constraint introduces two sets of distortions on financial markets. One is in the form of external financing premia affecting the cost of borrowing in one-period debt and working capital loans, and the return on equity. The second is Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism: When the leverage ratio is high enough, shocks of standard magnitudes, which would cause typical RBC-like responses without the credit friction, lead agents to fire-sell capital, causing a fall in investment and equity prices. This tightens further the constraint and leads to a spiraling collapse of credit, asset prices and investment, a decline in consumption and a surge in net exports. Moreover, since the constraint also hampers access to working capital, it causes a contemporaneous drop in output and factor allocations.
Quantitative analysis shows that the long-run business cycle moments of economies with and without the collateral constraint differ marginally, but the mean responses to one-standarddeviation shocks differ sharply across the two economies in states in which the leverage ratio is high enough to trigger the constraint. In contrast, if the constraint does not bind, the two economies produce similar responses. Hence, contrary to findings of previous studies (e.g.
Kocherlakota (2000) The model also does well at matching the observed dynamics of Sudden Stop events.
Sudden Stops are preceded by periods of expansion and external deficits, followed by large recessions and reversals in the external accounts when Sudden Stops hit, and then followed by a weak recovery. Moreover, Solow residuals exaggerate the contribution of true TFP to the Sudden Stops' output drop. These results are robust to variations in the labor supply elasticity and the share of imported inputs in production. In contrast, the assumption that the collateral constraint limits access to working capital financing plays an important role.
One important caveat in this regard is that the model's link between the credit crunch and a contemporaneous decline in output via working capital financing is only one way of modeling the immediate real effects of a credit collapse. There are other transmission mechanisms by which credit collapse can hurt economic activity. For example, a credit crisis can affect production and employment because of changes in capacity utilization, government policy changes in response to the credit crunch, or efficiency losses due to substitution of inputs that are imperfect substitutes (see Gertler et al. (2007) , Mendoza and Yue (2008)).
The findings of this paper have methodological implications for quantitative research on DSGE-SOE models with credit frictions. In particular, they show the importance of using nonlinear global methods in order to characterize accurately the dynamics by which the economy switches across binding and non-binding credit constraints, the amplification and asymmetry that occurs when the constraints bind, and the stochastic stationary state under the influence of strong precautionary saving effects. This is a contribution in line with Robert M. Merton's (2009) suggestion that models in macroeconomics and banking need to improve their handling of the non-linear dynamics at work in times of financial turbulence.
The paper also has three important policy implications. First, taking as given the underlying aggregate uncertainty and the contractual frictions behind collateral constraints, tighter "mark-tomarket" or "value-at-risk" capital requirements, designed to manage idiosyncratic risk, can make economies more vulnerable to Sudden Stops. In the model, tightening collateral requirements by reducing κ from 0.3 to 0.2 increases the long-run probability of Sudden Stops from 1. Note: The data were expressed in per capita terms, logged and detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Equity prices are in units of the GDP deflator. Intermediate goods prices are defined as the ratio of the deflator of imported intermediated goods divided by the exports deflator. "Sudden Stop" corresponds to the lowest deviation from trend observed in the corresponding variable (for variables in GDP ratios it is the largest change in percentage points observed in two consecutive quarters). The world real real interest rate is the sum of the return on 3-month U.S. T bills plus the EMBI+ spread for Mexican sovereign debt minus a measure of expected U.S. CPI inflation (see Uribe and Yue (2005) for details). Total factor productivity is measured using a production function for gross output that includes capital, labor and imported intermediate goods Net exports-GDP ratio Note : The classification of Sudden Stop events in the emerging markets data is taken from Calvo et al. (2006) . They define systemic sudden stop events as episodes with mild and large output collapses that coincide with large spikes in the EMBI spread and large reversals in capital flows. Tobin' Q is the ratio of market value of equity and debt outstanding over book value of equiy, and it is shown in levels instead of deviation from HP trend Note : Events from actual data are as in Figure 1 , which uses the definitions from Calvo et al. (2006) . Mexican data are for the Sudden Stop of 1995. Sudden Stop events in the model simulations are defined in a manner analogous to Calvo et al, as events in which the collateral constraint binds, output is at least one-standard-deviation below trend, and the trade balance-GDP ratio is at least one-standard-deviation above trend. Tobin's Q is shown in levels.
(medians of deviations from HP trends) 
